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Elevating Form over Substance: Viar v.
North Carolina Department of Transportation and its Progeny*
INTRODUCTION
"The North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure are mandatory
and 'failure to follow these rules will subject an appeal to dismissal."
This ubiquitous and oft-quoted phrase has been the stamp of disap-
proval employed to dismiss appeals because of appellate rule violations
following the ruling in Viar v. North Carolina Department of Transporta-
tion.2 In April 2005, the North Carolina Supreme Court admonished
the court of appeals in Viar for what it felt was untrammeled use of
Rule 2 to suspend rule violations and hear appeals.3 Prior to that time,
the court of appeals routinely invoked Rule 2 to reach the merits of
appeals when minor violations of the Rules of Appellate Procedure did
not hinder review. However, since Viar, the leash has tightened
around Rule 2, and the court of appeals has rarely summoned the Rule
to hear an appeal. The court of appeals, in essence, has become the
stomping grounds for appellants to surrender the contents of meritori-
ous appeals because of the harsh school of thought Viar has created.
Interpretations differ greatly as to the meaning of the Viar opin-
ion. The Supreme Court in Viar explicitly stated that "[iut is not the
role of the appellate courts . . . to create an appeal for an appellant.
[T]he Rules of Appellate Procedure must be consistently applied; oth-
erwise the Rules become meaningless, and an appellee is left without
notice of the basis upon which an appellate court might rule."4 A plain
reading of such language suggests the supreme court was concerned
with an appellate court creating an argument or appeal to justify a
result. However, because of the language in Viar, which states the
Rules of Appellate Procedure are mandatory, the court of appeals has
* The author would like to thank Chief Judge John Martin of the North Carolina
Court of Appeals, Judge Martha Geer of the North Carolina Court of Appeals, Warren
Savage of North Carolina Lawyers Mutual, and Carl Younger of Yates, McLamb and
Weyher.
1. Viar v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., 610 S.E.2d 360, 360 (N.C. 2005) (quoting
Steingress v. Steingress, 511 S.E.2d 298, 299 (N.C. 1999)).
2. Viar v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., 610 S.E.2d 360 (N.C. 2005).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 402.
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subsequently held it is "compelled by Viar to dismiss [an] appeal
based on ... failure to comply" with any rule.5
The supreme court's vague language and lack of guidance has led
to an inconsistent application of Rule 26 and a flurry of disagreement
between judges on the court of appeals on when to invoke the Rule.7
While it appears many judges on the court of appeals still wish to exer-
cise their discretion in suspending appellate rule violations that are
not egregious, others seem to view Viar as a way to torch the barn and
get the appellants out.
The Rules of Appellate Procedure were never intended to be used
as a cane to lash out at the unwary appellant, but instead should act as
a guideline to ensure a proper appeal and alert the court to the issues
raised. Certainly substantive and egregious violations of the Rules
should warrant dismissal. For instance, in Perkinson v. Hawley, the
appellant failed to settle the record on appeal as required by Rule
9(a)(1)(i).' Further, appellant's brief failed to comply with the appel-
late rules in multiple other aspects.9 Finally, the appellant failed to
reference any assignments of error in his brief pursuant to Rule
28(b)(6, and therefore the assignments were deemed abandoned. 10
Such oversight and egregious errors on the part of the appellant surtly
justify dismissing an appeal. It is also well 'settled that failure to serve
a proposed record on appeal pursuant to Rule 11 is a substantial viola-
5. Broderick v. Broderick, 623 S.E.2d 806, 806-07 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).
6. Compare State v. Buchanan, 613 S.E.2d 356, 356 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005)
(declining to invoke Rule 2 where defendant failed to preserve the grounds for his
appeal under Rule 10(b) for criminal convictions) with Coley v. State, 620 S.E.2d 25,
27 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (noting that although appellant violated several appellate
rules, none were substantive or egregious enough to warrant dismissal of appeal, and
Viar did not prohibit use of Rule 2) and Youse v. Duke Energy Corp., 614 S.E.2d 396,
400 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (invoking Rule 2 where defendant violated numerous
appellate rules but the Court could determine issues on appeal, plaintiff responded to
defendant's arguments and was therefore put on sufficient notice of the issues).
7. See Walsh v. Town of Wrightsville Beach, 632 S.E.2d 271 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006);
Youse, 614 S.E.2d 396; Stann v. Levine, 636 S.E.2d 214 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).
8. Perkinson v. Hawley, 2006 N.C. App. LEXIS 1810 at *2 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug. 15,
2006).
9. Id. at *3-4. The appellant's brief failed in the following aspects: (1) the pages in
the record were not numbered consecutively pursuant to Rule 9(b)(4); (2) the brief
failed to include a subject index as required by Rule 28(b)(1); (3) the brief failed to set
forth the standard of review as required by Rule 28(b)(6); (4) the brief failed to set
forth grounds for appellate review as required by Rule 28(b)(4); and (5) the brief
failed to include a certification of the brief pursuant to Rule 28(j)(2)(A)(2).
10. Id. at *3.
[Vol. 30:175176
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tion of the rules that mandates dismissal of the appeal.' However,
less blatant violations, in the wake of Viar, have created an inconsis-
tent approach to the suspension of Rule violations and have left judges
baffled on the appropriate time to afford relief.
This Comment explores the history of Rule 2 of the North Caro-
lina Rules of Appellate Procedure, the controversial ruling of Viar, and
how subsequent cases have interpreted the North Carolina Supreme
Court's ruling in Viar. What has emerged in the wake of Viar is an
inconsistent approach to appellate rule violations and much disagree-
ment on the amount of leeway an appellate court in North Carolina
has to invoke Rule 2. Further, post-Viar decisions have also laid the
foundation for the eradication of Rules 25 and 34.12 These rules,
which govern sanctioning for appellate rule violations, have been left
by the wayside as panels of the court of appeals continue to interpret
Viar as a mandate for dismissal. Finally, this Comment offers a solu-
tion to the current problem which plagues the appellate courts today:
by invoking a balancing test to determine the nature of the rule viola-
tion or adopting rules which allow the appellant to correct mistakes in
the brief, appellate courts should be able to exercise sound discretion
in determining which appeals are properly before the court.
I. RULE 2
Rule 2 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure has
been in existence for over thirty years and has allowed our appellate
courts to consider the merits of an appeal that is defective in some
manner or otherwise not in accordance with one or more of the forty-
two rules that currently govern appeals in this state. 13 Rule 2 provides
as follows:
11. Day v. Day, 637 S.E.2d 906, 908 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (citing with approval
Higgins v. Town of China Grove, 402 S.E.2d 885, 886 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991); Woods v.
Shelton, 379 S.E.2d 45, 47 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989); McLeod v. Faust, 374 S.E.2d 417, 417
(N.C. Ct. App. 1988)).
12. N.C. R. App. P. 25; N.C. R. App. P. 34. Rules 25 and 34 of the North Carolina
Rules of Appellate Procedure govern sanctioning for Rule violations. Rule 25 states in
pertinent part:
A court of the appellate division may, on its own initiative or motion of a
party, impose a sanction against a party or attorney or both when the court
determines that such party or attorney or both substantially failed to comply
with these appellate rules. The court may impose sanctions of the type and in
the manner prescribed by Rule 34 for frivolous appeals.
13. Brady Yntema, Appellate Procedures and Technicalities, Address at the North
Carolina Association of Defense Attorneys Annual Meeting (June 22-25, 2006).
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To prevent manifest injustice to a party, or to expedite decision in the
public interest, either court of the appellate division may, except as
otherwise expressly provided by these rules, suspend or vary the
requirements or provisions of any of these rules in a case pending
before it upon application of a party or upon its own initiative, and
may order proceedings in accordance with its directions. 14
Rule 2 has not been amended since its adoption on June 13, 1975. The
"Supreme Court [of North Carolina] has stated that 'Rule 2 relates to
the residual power of our appellate courts to consider, in exceptional
circumstances, significant issues of importance in the public interest,
or to prevent injustice which appears manifest to the Court and only in
such instances.""' 5  Prior to Viar, the court of appeals routinely
invoked Rule 2 to suspend the rules of appellate procedure and allow
defective appeals to be decided on their merits.1 6 Such cases often
involved multiple rule violations that were waived in order for the
appeal to go forward.
17
Traditionally, Rule 2 would not be extended to forgive substantive
or egregious defects in an appeal that would place the burden on the
appellee to respond or burden the appellate court in determining the
issues on appeal.' 8
II. VIAR V. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
On June 12, 1997, Megan and Macey Viar were killed in a motor
vehicle accident on Interstate Highway 85 in Rowan County.' 9 Melissa
Viar, the decedents' sister, was driving in a rainstorm when she lost
control of the car, crossed the median, and collided with a tractor-
trailer truck.2 ° Both Megan and Macey died instantly, and Melissa sus-
tained serious injuries.2 1
14. N.C. R. Ap. P. 2.
15. Hill v. West, 627 S.E.2d 662, 663 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Steingress v.
Steingress, 511 S.E.2d 298, 299-300 (N.C. 1999)).
16. Yntema, supra note 14.
17. See Cannon v. Day, 598 S.E.2d 207, 209-10 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (invoking
Rule 2 although there were multiple rule violations, including: no statement of the
grounds for appellate review, no page references to the record or transcript in the
Statement of Facts, no specification of the pertinent assignments of error following the
questions presented, and the briefs incorrect font and excessive number of lines per
page).
18. Shook v. County of Buncombe, 480 S.E.2d 706 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997).
19. Viar v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., 590 S.E.2d 909, 911 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
20. Id.
21. Id.
[Vol. 30:175178
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On March 6, 1998, Claude Viar filed an affidavit with the N.C.
Industrial Commission under the North Carolina Tort Claims Act,
asserting a claim for negligence against the North Carolina Depart-
ment of Transportation (NCDOT).22 He alleged that Megan and
Macey's deaths were proximately caused by the absence of a guard rail
between the north and southbound lanes of the interstate.23 Mr. Viar
later amended the complaint and alleged negligence on the part of sev-
eral other NCDOT employees, who he asserted were responsible for
not placing median barriers on that stretch of interstate.24
The deputy commissioner issued an opinion denying Viar's claim
on November 20, 2000, and Mr. Viar appealed to the Full Commission,
which affirmed the decision of the deputy commissioner. 25 The Com-
mission concluded that Mr. Viar had failed to show that NCDOT was
negligent in not installing a median barrier on that section of the
highway.26
The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds that
the Industrial Commission erred by failing to make adequate findings
to support its conclusion that NCDOT's actions were reasonable, rely-
ing on an improperly conducted assessment of the financial cost of
installing median barriers and failing to make necessary findings of
fact.27 Judge Levinson authored the opinion, Judge Wynn concurred,
and Judge Tyson dissented.
In his dissent, Judge Tyson pointed out multiple Rule violations by
the appellant, and relied on Shook v. County of Buncombe in support of
his contention that the appeal should be dismissed.28 Specifically,
Judge Tyson was concerned with two defects in the plaintiffs appeal.
First, Judge Tyson noted that our supreme court has ruled that
"where no exception is taken to a finding of fact by the trial court, the
finding is presumed to be supported by competent evidence and is
binding on appeal." 29 Tyson further noted that since the "plaintiff
failed to assert error to any of the Commission[er]'s findings of fact,
the ... findings [were] binding and [the Court of Appeals] must con-
clude they are supported by competent evidence.
30
22. Id. at 911-12.
23. Id. at 912.
24. Viar, 590 S.E.2d at 912.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 919-20.
28. Viar,590 S.E.2d at 921 (Tyson, J., dissenting).
29. Id.
30. Id.
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Second, Judge Tyson maintained the appeal should be dismissed
because the appellant's brief violated Rule 28(b)(6), which requires
that, immediately following each question argued, the appellant iden-
tify "the pages at which [the assignment of error] appear in the printed
record on appeal. ' 31  Tyson argued that the appellant's question
presented and arguments on that issue did not correspond to the first
assignment of error.32 Accordingly, Tyson stated that the appeal was
not properly before the court and should be dismissed.33
Relying on Judge Tyson's dissent, the NCDOT appealed, and on
April 7, 2005, the North Carolina Supreme Court issued a per curiam
opinion dismissing the appeal for appellate rules violations.34 In the
brief and somewhat curt opinion, the Court pointed out that appellant
failed to comply with Rule 10 and Rule 28(b). 35
The supreme court found appellant's two assignments of error
were not numbered and did not make specific record references.36
Further, the court stated that the second assignment of error did not
"'state plainly, concisely and without argumentation the legal basis on
which error [was] assigned.' ' 37 The court also found that appellant
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 922.
34. Viar v. North Carolina Dep't of Transp., 610 S.E.2d 360 (N.C. 2005).
35. Id. at 360. N.C. R. App. P. 10; N.C. R. App. P. 28(b). Rule 10 states, in pertinent
part:
(1) Form; Record References. A listing of the assignments of error upon which
an appeal is predicated shall be stated at the conclusion of the record on
appeal in short form without argument, and shall be separately numbered.
Each assignment of error shall so far as practicable, be confined to a single
issue of law; and shall state plainly, concisely, and without argumentation
the legal basis on which error is assigned. An assignment of error is sufficient
if it directs the attention of the appellate court to the particular error about
which the question is made, with clear and specific record or transcript
references. Questions made as to several issues or findings relating to one
ground of recovery or defense may be combined in one assignment of error,
if separate record or transcript references are made.
With respect to the appellant brief, Rule 28(b) requires, in pertinent part:
(6) An argument, to contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to
each question presented. Each question shall be separately stated.
Immediately following each question shall be a reference to the assignments
of error pertinent to the question, identified by their numbers and by the
pages at which they appear in the printed record on appeal. Assignments of
error not set out in the appellant's brief, or in support of which no reason or
argument is stated or authority cited, will be taken as abandoned.
36. Id. at 361.
37. Id. (alteration in original).
[Vol. 30:175180
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made no argument as to the first stated assignment of error in his
brief, and thus, the error was abandoned pursuant to Rule 28(b)(6). 38
The supreme court then admonished the court of appeals for the
invocation of Rule 2 to hear the merits of the appeal, stating: "[i]t is not
the role of the appellate courts ... to create an appeal for an appellant.
As this case illustrates, the Rules . . . must be consistently applied;
otherwise, the Rules become meaningless, and an appellee is left with-
out notice of the basis upon which an appellate court might rule. 39
This one statement has resulted in a number of appeals being dis-
missed for Rule violations.
III. PRE-VIAR USE OF RULE 2
Before Rule 2 was curtailed by the opinion, or the misconstrued
language of the opinion, in Viar, the court of appeals routinely invoked
Rule 2 to hear cases on the merits. For instance, in Anthony v. City of
Shelby,4 ° the appellant's brief contained identical violations to those in
the case of Viar, specifically violations of Rule 10(c)(1) and 28(b)(6).4'
However, without much explanation, except for stating the appellant
had violated the rules, the court of appeals declared that
"[nievertheless, we have considered their arguments and affirm the
trial court's order.
42
A year before Viar, Judge Geer authored an opinion in which the
court of appeals invoked Rule 2 and suspended multiple rules viola-
tions.43 The court noted that the appellant's brief violated the rules of
appellate procedure in the following manner:
(1) the briefs Table of Cases and Authorities contains no references to
the pages on which the citations appear, in violation of N.C. R. App. P.
26(g)(2) and 28(b)(1); (2) the brief contains no statement of the
grounds for appellate review, in violation of N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(4);
(3) the briefs Statement of Facts contains almost no page references to
the transcript, the record, or exhibits, in violation of N.C. R. App. P.
28(b)(5); and (4) in the briefs argument section, the questions
presented are not followed by specification of the pertinent assign-
ments of error, in violation of N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6). In addition to
those rule violations pointed out by plaintiffs, we also note that defen-
dant's brief is printed in 11-point non-proportionally-spaced type, with
38. Id.
39. Id. (citing with approval Bradshaw v. Stansberry, 79 S.E. 302 (1913)).
40. Anthony v. City of Shelby, 567 S.E.2d 222 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 225 (citation omitted).
43. Cannon v. Day, 598 S.E.2d 207 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
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more than 27 lines per page, in violation of N.C. R. App. P. 26(g)(1)
and 28(j).4 4
The court of appeals, although stating it was very concerned about the
extent of the violations, elected to suspend the rules pursuant to Rule 2
in order to review the defendant's assignments of error.4 5
However, the violations did not go unnoticed. Chief Judge John
Martin, in a poignant concurrence, expressed his disapproval of the
violations of the rules and reiterated that the rules of appellate proce-
dure were mandatory, not directory.4 6 Citing former Chief Justice
Story of the North Carolina Supreme Court, Chief Judge Martin wrote:
The work of the Court is constantly increasing, and, if it is to keep up
with its docket, which it is earnestly striving to do, an orderly proce-
dure, marked by a due observance of the rules, must be maintained.
When litigants resort to the judiciary for the settlement of their dis-
putes, they are invoking a public agency, and they should not forget
that rules of procedure are necessary, and must be observed, in order
to enable the courts properly to discharge their duties.47
According to Chief Judge Martin's opinion, Rule 2 should only be
invoked where the error would deny a fair trial, or the error is a techni-
cality that does not affect the court in ruling on the appeal. 48
Prior to Viar, the North Carolina Court of Appeals also routinely
summoned Rule 2 to save appeals. 49 The widespread usage of the rule
creates a number of questions in the post-Viar world. When, now, can
Rule 2 be invoked? What has happened to Appellate Rules 25 and 34,
the rules governing sanctioning for appellate rule violations? As stated
earlier, in Viar, the supreme court reprimanded the court of appeals
for what it felt was unrestrained use of Rule 2.50 However, the supreme
court's opinion did nothing more than create further inconsistency
and confusion for determining the appropriate time to suspend the
rules and hear the merits of an appeal.
44. Id. at 209-10.
45. Id. at 210.
46. Id. at 213 (Martin, CJ., concurring).
47. Id. (quoting Pruitt v. Wood, 156 S.E. 126, 127 (N.C. 1930)).
48. Cannon, 598 S.E.2d at 213.
49. See Stockton v. Estate of Thompson, 600 S.E.2d 13, 15 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004)
(withstanding violation of Rule 28(b)(4)); see also N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Allen, 553 S.E.2d 420, 422 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (withstanding violation of Rule
28(b)(5)); Cannon, 598 S.E.2d at 209-210 (withstanding violations of Rules 2 6(g)(2),
28(b)(1), 28(b)(4), 28(b)(5), 28(b)(6), and 2 6 (g)(1)).
50. Viar v. North Carolina Dep't of Transp., 610 S.E.2d 360, 361 (N.C. 2005).
[Vol. 30:175182
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IV. THE POST-VIAR WORLD: IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES
From April 2005 to December 2006, the Court of Appeals cited
Viar over one hundred times, frequently dismissing an appeal for vio-
lations of rules of appellate procedure. Viar has created an inconsis-
tent approach to the application' of Rule 2, creating an outbreak of
disagreement among the judges on the court of appeals. While many
judges have pursued a strict application of Viar, others have noted
their disapproval of such a harsh standard.51 In many cases that have
invoked Viar, panels have concluded that dismissal is mandatory even
if the rule violations do not frustrate the issues on appeal.52 Many of
these dismissals have involved deficiencies in assignments of error that
the court has dismissed on its own initiative, without a second thought
as to whether the appellee was actually prejudiced.53
The greatest problem has been the inconsistent approach of the
court to apply Rule 2 to save an appeal. A stark example of such con-
flicting applications can be found in two recent cases. In Stann v.
Levine, an appeal was dismissed for multiple violations of the appellate
rules.54 The appellant violated Rule 26(g), which requires that "the
body of the text shall be presented in double spacing between each line
of text."'5 5 The brief contained pages with thirty-five lines of text, as
opposed to the required twenty-seven lines.5 6 Additionally, the brief
failed to include a statement of the grounds for appellate review as
mandated by Rule 28(b)(4).57 Moreover, the argument failed to "con-
tain a concise statement of the applicable standard(s) of review for
each question presented" as well as any citation of authorities in viola-
tion of Rule 28(b)(6). 58 The court also found the appellant's statement
of facts was in violation of Rule 28(b)(5), which states that "[a]n appel-
lant's brief in any appeal shall contain . . . [a] full and complete state-
ment of the facts ... supported by references to pages in the transcript
51. See Stann v. Levine, 636 S.E.2d 214, 222 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (Geer. J.,
dissenting); see also Consolidated Elec. Distrib., Inc. v. Dorsey, 613 S.E.2d 518, 521
(N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (Wynn, J., concurring).
52. See Walsh v. Town of Wrightsville Beach Bd. Of Aldermen, 632 S.E.2d 271, 273
(N.C. Ct. App. 2006); see also State v. Buchanan, 613 S.E.2d 356, 356 (N.C. Ct. App.
2005).
53. See Broderick v. Broderick, 623 S.E.2d 806 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006); see also Jet
Air, LLC v. Triad Aviation, Inc., 628 S.E.2d 806 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).
54. Stann, 636 S.E.2d at 214.
55. Id. at 216 (citing N.C. R. App. P. 2 6(g)).
56. Stann v. Levine, 636 S.E.2d 214, 216 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (Geer. J.,
dissenting).
57. Id.
58. Id.
183
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of the proceedings, the record on appeal, or exhibits, as the case may
be."'59 Finally, in the court's opinion, the most significant error was a
violation of Rule 10(c)(1).6" The majority opinion noted that appel-
lant's assignment of error was not stated at the conclusion of the
record and the assignment or error, attempting to dismiss on jurisdic-
tional grounds, was overbroad, vague, and unspecific.6'
The majority opinion, written by Judge Jackson with Judge Tyson
concurring, noted the court of appeals has "held that when a litigant
exercises 'substantial' compliance with the appellate rules, the appeal
may not be dismissed for a technical violation of the rules. ' 62 How-
ever, Judge Jackson stated that a "substantial compliance exception to
the rules had not been expressly endorsed by our Supreme Court."63
Judge Jackson, as well as many other judges, overlooks Rule 25 of the
North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure post-Viar. The supreme
court has the authority to determine the rules of appellate procedure
pursuant to N.C. Const. art. IV, § 13(2), and Rule 25 states explicitly
that "a court of the appellate division may . . . impose a sanction
against a party or attorney or both when the court determines that
such party or attorney or both substantially failed to comply with these
appellate rules."6 4 Rule 34 states that an appellate court may impose a
sanction when the court determines that a brief "grossly violated
appellate court rules. 65
It would appear from the context of Rule 25 of the Rules of Appel-
late Procedure that the supreme court has spoken on the topic of sub-
stantial compliance. Cases subsequent to Viar have failed to employ
Rules 25 or 34, both of which deal with sanctioning in the cases of rule
violations. Strict constructionists have read Viar to rule that all appel-
late rule violations will subject an appeal to dismissal. However, a
more sensible reading of Viar illustrates the supreme court was con-
cerned about the author of an opinion creating an argument that the
appellant never made to justify a result the court wanted to be
achieved.
Judge Geer argued in her dissent in Stann that the focus of the
court's opinion in Viar was the court of appeals' reliance on Rule 2 to
59. Id. (quoting N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(5)).
60. Id. at 217.
61. Id.
62. Stann, 636 S.E.2d at 219 (GeerJ., dissenting) (quoting Spencerv. Spencer, 575
S.E.2d 780, 785 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003)).
63. Id.
64. N.C. R. App. P. 25(b) (emphasis added).
65. N.C. R. App. P. 34(a)(3).
[Vol. 30:175
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address an issue not raised or argued by an appellant and reiterated
the language of Viar, indicating that it is not the role of the appellate
courts to create an appeal for an appellant.6 6 Judge Geer, who stressed
the court of appeals was increasingly elevating form over substance,
argued that such a stringent construction of Viar would lead to whole-
sale dismissals.67
First, Judge Geer stated "the proper line is to dismiss only those
appeals that substantively affect the ability of the appellee to respond
and this Court to address the appeal."68 She then cited a number of
cases where other panels of the court of appeals had construed Viar
similarly and concluded the court of appeals retains discretion under
Rule 2 to hear an appeal despite minor rule violations.6 9 Judge Geer
voiced her concern over the implications such an austere construction
of Viar would mandate. Specifically, an "appellant has little ability to
ensure that his or her counsel complies with the appellate rules...,
[and] a legal malpractice claim may be difficult to pursue. . ., and col-
legiality and principles of professionalism will have to be set aside in
order to ensure proper representation of the appellate client."
70
Judge Geer also noted her disagreement with the majority's con-
tention that appellant violated Rules 28(b)(5) and 10(c)(1). In regards
to Rule 10(c)(1), Judge Geer argued the triviality of the rule violation
where the appellant placed the assignments of error on page 111 of a
117 page record.71 In addition, appellant's assignment of error stated
that the trial court committed reversible error by dismissing the action
of the plaintiff for lack of jurisdiction.72 Judge Geer stated it was
unclear what the majority would have preferred appellant to have
stated, and the phrasing of the assignment of error did not substan-
tively impact the appeal in this case.73 The dissent's final concern
focused on the appellees' violations of the appellate rules. According
to Judge Geer, the culture created by Viar only imposes sanctions on
66. Stann, 636 S.E.2d at 223 (Geer, J., dissenting).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Stann, 636 S.E.2d at 223 (Geer, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Hill, 632 S.E.2d
777, 790 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006); Welch Contracting, Inc. v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., 622
S.E.2d 691, 694 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005); Davis v. Columbus County Schs., 622 S.E.2d
671, 674 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005); Coley v. State, 620 S.E.2d 25, 27 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005)).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 224-25.
72. Id. at 217.
73. Id. at 225.
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the appellant while "allow[ing] appellees to violate the rules with
impunity.
74
Interestingly, Judge Tyson, who concurred in the majority opinion
of Stann also joined in the majority opinion of Seay v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. 75 The case of Seay arose out of a worker's compensation claim
that was denied by the Industrial Commission.76 At the outset of the
opinion, the panel noted that appellant failed to comply with both Rule
10(c)(1) and Rule 28(b)(6).77 With respect to the first violation, the
appellant failed to reference the record or transcript in his assignment
of error.78 The second violation arose from the appellant's failure to
make any reference to his sole assignment of error or include the num-
bers and pages by which it appeared in the record.79 The panel con-
cluded that reaching the merits of the case "does not create an appeal
for an appellant or cause this Court to examine issues not raised by the
appellant . . . , [and] [djefendants were given sufficient notice of the
issue on appeal as evidenced by the filing of their brief thoroughly
responding to plaintiffs argument. "8 Such inconsistency leads to a
misapplication of the rules of appellate procedure, and if Viar is to be
strictly followed according to a conservative reading, this appeal
should have been dismissed.
Several months prior to Seay, the court of appeals was faced with a
similar case involving identical rule violations. In Walsh v. Town of
Wrightsville Beach,"' Judge Calabria, writing for the majority, dis-
missed an appeal again involving violations of Rules 10(c)(1) and
28(b)(6).82 The majority expressed that "'[w]here a panel of the Court
of Appeals has decided the same issue, albeit in a different case, a sub-
sequent panel of the same court is bound by that precedent, unless it
has been overturned by a higher court.' 8s3 If the court of appeals is
bound by such precedent, it would appear that Seay should have been
dismissed because of the decision in Walsh or other prior decisions
that dismissed violations of Rule 10(c)(1) and 28(b)(6). However, the
74. Stann, 636 S.E.2d at 226 (Geer, J., dissenting).
75. Seay v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 637 S.E.2d 299 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 300.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 301.
81. Walsh v. Town of Wrightsville Beach Bd. of Aldermen, 632 S.E.2d 271 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2006).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 273 (quoting In re Appeal from Civil Penalty, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (N.C.
1989)).
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court is routinely inconsistent in its application of the rules post-Viar,
which creates a culture that Viar did not intend.
Judge Hunter dissented in Walsh:
"Since the decision of the Supreme Court in Viar, this Court has not
treated violations of the Rules as grounds for automatic dismissal.
Instead, the Court has weighed (1) the impact of the violations on the
appellee, (2) the importance of upholding the integrity of the Rules,
and (3) the public policy reasons for reaching the merits in a particular
case."
84
If this is accurate, it would appear the court of appeals would invoke a
balancing test to determine if the nature of the rule violation
prejudiced the appellee or prevented the court from effectively deter-
mining the issues on appeal without creating an argument or appeal
for the appellant. However, the inconsistency of application has fallen
short of reaching the test Judge Hunter espouses.
Two schools of thought have emerged in the post-Viar world: (1)
those panels that feel that minor rule violations that do not prejudice
the appellee and enable the court to decipher the arguments on appeal
should allow the invocation of Rule 2; and (2) other panels that read
Viar strictly and mandate that most, if not all, rule violations are sub-
ject to dismissal without any regard for sanctioning set forth in Rules
25 and 34. The latter panels have become consumed with dismissals
and appear to view the rule violations as a cancer that should be
excised as early as possible.
The judges on the court of appeals are elected and appointed to
exercise their wisdom and discretion to hear appeals and decide the
merits of certain cases. While it is true that such discretion may not
be arbitrary or capricious, we certainly cannot curtail their authority
by a strict reading of Viar. The present situation can be analogized
quite simply to a speeding violation. Law enforcement officers rou-
tinely exhibit such discretion in determining a violation of such speed-
ing laws. If every motorist were ticketed for traveling 58 m.p.h. in a 55
m.p.h. zone, we would be a nation of walkers and bicyclists. However,
such harsh application cannot survive. We allow these officers of the
law discretion on whom to ticket, and it usually falls upon those
motorists committing the most egregious violations of speeding laws.
While it is true that speed limits are mandatory, and not directory,
the same can be said of the rules of appellate procedure. When a panel
of the court of appeals determines a rule violation does not frustrate
84. Id. at 274 (Hunter, J., dissenting) (quoting Hammonds v. Lumbee River Elec.
Membership Corp., 631 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006)).
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the issues on appeal or prejudice the appellee, the court, in its discre-
tion, should be allowed to suspend the rules in order to hear the merits
on appeal or impose sanctions on appellant's counsel. While it is cer-
tainly true that Viar reprimanded the court of appeals for routinely
invoking Rule 2 to save an appeal, the supreme court, by the plain
language in the opinion, was primarily concerned with the court of
appeals creating an appeal by addressing issues not raised by the
appellant in his brief.
However, while such a concept seems quite simple, the supreme
court recently affirmed that the court of appeals "may not review an
appeal that violates the Rules of Appellate Procedure even though such
violations neither impede our comprehension of the issues nor frustrate
the appellate process.'' 5 This statement, while adopted by the supreme
court, further eviscerates Rule 2 and leaves Rules 25 and 34 by the
wayside. A strict construction of such language effectively allows per
se dismissal without a second thought of the suspension of appellate
rules or sanctions.
Judge Hunter attempted to reintroduce sanctions in the winter of
2005 involving a case where the appellant violated Rules 10 and Rule
28.86 In his dissent, he stated:
[T]he assignments of error provide sufficient information to permit the
Court to accept that the legal basis for defendant's appeal included a
challenge to the acceptance of an expert witness, that insufficient evi-
dence was presented to support certain of the trial court's findings,
and that the trial court erred in its legal classification of the property.
Therefore, review of these assignments of error does not create an
appeal for defendant as prohibited by Viar v. N.C. Dep't of Transp
87
He further stated the appellee "was neither disadvantaged nor was the
court unduly burdened by the imprecise wording of defendant's
assignments of error and failure to include the standard of review. ''8 8
Because the plaintiff did not contend that the defendant's assignments
of error were insufficient, and the court was not creating an appeal, he
suggested reviewing the merits while imposing sanctions pursuant to
Rule 25(b).8 9 Judge Geer went so far to say that "any violation of Rule
85. Munn v. N.C. State Univ., 626 S.E.2d 270 (N.C. 2006) (reversing per curiam for
the reasons stated in Judge Jackson's dissenting opinion, in Munn v. N.C. State Univ.,
617 S.E.2d 335 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005)) (emphasis added).
86. Bennett v. Bennett, 638 S.E.2d. 243, 245-46 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (Hunter, J.,
dissenting).
87. Id. at 245.
88. Id. at 245.
89. Id. at 245-46.
188 [Vol. 30:175
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10 is purely technical and cannot justify the sanction of dismissal
under Rules 25 and 34 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure."9
V. CONSISTENT INCONSISTENCY
Relying on the appellate rules, at least one panel of the court of
appeals attempted to overturn prior law that the North Carolina
Supreme Court had not reversed. In Ellis v. Williams,9 the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals when it dismissed an
appeal after the appellant had failed to list assignments of error to a
summary judgment order. The supreme court held that the "purpose
of summary judgment is to eliminate formal trial when the only ques-
tions involved are questions of law." 92 The court further stated that
summary judgment is always based on: (1) whether there is a genuine
issue of material fact; and (2) whether the moving party is entitled to
summary judgment, and that "notice of appeal adequately apprises the
opposing party and the appellate court of the limited issues to be
reviewed. Exceptions and assignments of error add nothing. '93 The
supreme court noted that assignments of error normally aid the court
in sifting through the record and determining the scope of review, but
in cases of summary judgment, an appellate court must carefully
examine the entire record, and requiring an appellant to list assign-
ments of error would be a superfluous formality.
94
As the court of appeals consistently states, "'[ilt is elementary that
this Court is bound by holdings of the Supreme Court."' 95 However,
such a statement does not prove true in application. Subsequent to
Ellis, the North Carolina Court of Appeals in Shook v. County of Bun-
combe, held "[i]n our view, Ellis is no longer the law."'96 The court of
appeals reasoned that in light of the supreme court's substantive
amendment to Rule 10, Ellis no longer applied. 97 In a 2006 unpub-
lished opinion, Snow v. County of Dare, the court of appeals dismissed
an appeal from an entry of summary judgment when the two assign-
ments of error read as follows: "(1) the trial court erred in granting
90. Jones v. Harrelson and Smith Contractors, LLC, 638 S.E.2d 222, 230 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2006) (Geer, J., dissenting).
91. Ellis v. Williams, 355 S.E.2d 479 (N.C. 1987).
92. Id. at 481.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Jones, 638 S.E.2d at 228 (quoting Rogerson v. Fitzpatrick, 468 S.E.2d 447, 450
(N.C. Ct. App. 1996)).
96. Shook v. County of Buncombe, 480 S.E.2d 706, 707 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997).
97. Id.
189
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summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, [and] (2) the trial court erred
in failing to grant summary judgment in favor of defendant."98 The
court of appeals ruled that in light of the Viar precedent, it was com-
pelled to dismiss the appeal.99
However, in a recent opinion by Chief Judge Martin, the court of
appeals in Nelson v. Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company re-
affirmed the viability of Ellis in light of Viar.'0° Chief Judge Martin
first noted that a recent opinion of the court of appeals appeared to
state a new rule regarding sufficiency of assignment of error, citing
Hubert Jet Air, LLC v. Triad Aviation, Inc.' 1 In Hubert, the panel dis-
missed the plaintiffs appeal from a partial summary judgment order
because the assignment of error was deemed to be insufficient.' 2
Chief Judge Martin then confirmed that a contrary rule, not overruled
by the supreme court, established that no assignment of error is neces-
sary when the sole question is whether the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment. 10 3 Chief Judge Martin then stated:
[Tjhis Court is required to follow the decisions of our Supreme Court,
as well as our prior precedents. Although the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Viar ... directed this Court not to create an appeal for the
appellant, and to ensure an appellee has notice of the basis upon which
an appellate court might rule, we think the reasoning of Viar and Ellis
are compatible. In any case, Viar does not address the issue of assignments
of error and summary judgment, and does not overrule Ellis. Accord-
ingly, we follow Ellis and the precedents of this Court, and determine
that plaintiffs' assignment of error with respect to the order granting
summary judgment is sufficient. ' 0 4
Nelson and Snow illustrate the dichotomy of the two schools of
thought prevalent within the court of appeals in the post-Viar world.
While many panels, such as the majority in Nelson, can read Viar in
light of its true meaning and apply prior precedent to distinguish the
supreme court's intent, other panels, such as the one in Snow, apply a
per se dismissal to all appellate rule violations, regardless of precedent.
98. Snow v. County of Dare, 2006 N.C. App LEXIS 1040, *2 (N.C. Ct. App. May 16,
2006).
99. Id.
100. Nelson v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 630 S.E.2d 221 (N.C. Ct. App.
2006).
101. Id. at 226.
102. Hubert Jet Air, LLC v. Triad Aviation, Inc., 628 S.E.2d 806 (N.C. Ct. App.
2006).
103. Nelson, 630 S.E.2d at 226-27 (citing Vernon, Vernon, Wooten, Brown &
Andrews, P.A. v. Miller, 326 S.E.2d 316, 319 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985)).
104. Id. (emphasis added).
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The latter panels invoke mandatory language, such as the elementary
nature of following supreme court precedent, but they are the ones, in
contradiction with Viar, that seek to create the argument that justifies
the result they feel is necessary.
Conflicting opinions as to assignments of error have also arisen in
appeals involving judgments notwithstanding the verdict. In Jones v.
Harrelson & Smith Contractors, LLC, the majority dismissed the appeal
when the appellant's assignment of errors involved vague language that
did not specify the legal basis on which error is assigned. 10 5 The
plaintiffs assignments of error read, in pertinent part: "(1) did the
trial court,... err in ... granting,... the defendant's prior Motion for
Directed Verdict on the plaintiffs unfair and deceptive trade practice
claim .. .?, and (2) did the trial court err by ... granting defendant's
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict as to the fraud claim
and award of compensatory damages?" 10 6
The dissent argued the majority would require the plaintiff to
restate the obvious, since as with summary judgment decisions, a
directed verdict or entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict
involves only a single question of law: whether the evidence was suffi-
cient to support the claim. 10 7 Pointing out that restating the obvious
would be a superfluous formality, the dissent argued that Ellis and the
present case could not be reconciled, and therefore the assignments of
error should not be abandoned.' 0 8 Such ambiguities present difficult
scenarios to resolve without the guidance of the supreme court. How-
ever, the majority, constrained by the ruling in Viar, continued to pur-
sue a narrow interpretation of the rules of appellate procedure and
dismissed the appeal without analysis of the comparative nature of
summary judgment and judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 10 9
VI. THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT
Inconsistency of the application of the rules of appellate proce-
dure has also plagued criminal appeals. Two cases provide a stark
example of identical violations with differing results. In State v.
Buchanan," ° the defendant failed to comply with Rule 10(b) by not
105. Jones v. Harrelson and Smith Contrs., LLC, 638 S.E.2d 222, 227-28 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2006).
106. Id. at 227.
107. Id. at 230 (Geer, J., dissenting) (citing Alberti v. Manufactured Homes, Inc.,
381 S.E.2d 478, 480 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989)).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. State v. Buchanan, 613 S.E.2d 356 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
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renewing his motion to dismiss at the close of all evidence.' Because
the panel of the court of appeals was constrained by Viar, the appeal
was dismissed, the reasoning being that in Viar, the "Supreme Court
stated that this Court may not review an appeal that violates the Rules
of Appellate Procedure even though such violations neither impede
our comprehension of the issues nor frustrate the appellate pro-
cess.""' Just over a year later, a different panel of the court of appeals
invoked Rule 2 to prevent manifest injustice in an appeal involving an
identical violation.' 1 3 Judge Steelman dissented, identifying the failure
to renew the motion to dismiss was identical to the case of State v.
Buchanan. He stated that "for the law to have any meaning or integ-
rity, it must be applied in a consistent manner. If it is not, then it is
being applied in an arbitrary and capricious manner, which can only
bring disrepute upon the courts. ' 14
How can these cases be resolved? The simple answer is they can-
not. It has been stated "'[w]here a panel of the Court of Appeals has
decided the same issue, albeit in a different case, a subsequent panel of
the same court is bound by that precedent, unless it has been over-
turned by a higher court.' ''1 a5 However, differing panels continue to
apply the rules in an arbitrary manner where one panel determines
that manifest injustice enables Rule 2 to apply but another follows the
stringent dictates of Viar.
VII. ABOLITION OF ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
It is well settled and has been evidenced by the above arguments
that most dismissals post-Viar have been the result of violations of
Rule 10, as well as Rule 28, which govern the proper format of
assigning error on appeal. In Broderick, Judge Wynn urged the
supreme court to abolish assignments of error pursuant to its exclusive
authority to create the rules of appellate procedure." 6 Judge Wynn
noted the abolishment of such rules would be "consistent with the Fed-
eral Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Local Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure for the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and
111. Id. at 356.
112. Id. at 357.
113. State v. Denny, 635 S.E.2d 438, 440 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).
114. Id. at 442 (Steelman, J., dissenting).
115. Walsh v. Town of Wrightsville Beach Bd. of Aldermen, 632 S.E.2d 271, 273
(N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting In re Appeal from Civil Penalty, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37
(1989)).
116. Broderick v. Broderick, 623 S.E.2d 806, 807 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (Wynn, J.,
concurring).
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the appellate rules of other state courts, which do not require parties
to file assignments of error on appeal."'1 17 He then cited multiple
examples of states that have abolished such rules.'11
Judge Wynn holds the position, as noted earlier, that the "cost of
effectively denying our citizens access to justice in our appellate courts
outweighs the benefits of strictly enforcing the technical requirements
for assignments of error."' 9 Abolishing assignments of error would
make North Carolina consistent with other jurisdictions and would
allow appellants with meritorious appeals a greater opportunity for
access to the judicial system.
VIII. IMPLICATIONS OF VAR AND RELIEF FOR APPELLANTS
The implications of Viar stretch beyond the mere dismissal of an
appeal for appellate rule violations, whether the violations are techni-
cal in nature or constitute an egregious disobedience of a substantial
rule. A per se dismissal of an appeal for rules violations, regardless of
the significance of the violations, is unjust to the parties. 120 The appel-
lant possesses no particular guarantees of trustworthiness that his or
her lawyer will adequately conform to the rules of appellate procedure
to survive what in effect has become a strict scrutiny standard. Fur-
ther, because of carelessness of the counsel, a "party with an otherwise
meritorious appeal may be left with no remedy or relief."' 2 1 In order to
prevail on a legal malpractice claim, an appellant must prove that he or
she would have prevailed both on appeal and on remand.1 22 This
exceedingly difficult hurdle of proving malpractice on the part of
appellate counsel affords many appellants no relief. For a criminal
defendant to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, "a
117. Id. at 808.
118. Id. See A.A. R. APP P. 20 (providing that assignments of error in Alabama
appellate courts are no longer required); FLA. R. App. P. 9.040 (stating "[a]ssignments
of error are neither required nor permitted" in Florida appellate courts); Camputaro v.
Stuart Hardwood Corp., 429 A.2d 796, 801 (Conn. 1980) ("Although this issue was
not initially assigned as error, it is properly before us under [Connecticut] Practice
Book, 1978, § 3060W, which abolishes the necessity of filing assignments of error.");
Murcherson v. State, 145 S.E.2d 58 (Ga. App. 1965) (noting that the Appellate Practice
Act of 1965 abolishes assignments of error in Georgia); Trust Co. of Chicago v.
Iroquois Auto Insur. Underwriters, Inc., 2 N.E.2d 338 (Ill. Ct. App. 1936) ("The
former practice of formal assignment of error attached to the record accomplished
nothing in the aid of the court, and this was the reason for its abolition .
119. Broderick, 623 S.E.2d at 808 (Wynn, J., concurring).
120. Stann v. Levine, 636 S.E.2d 214, 224 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (Geer, J.,
dissenting).
121. Id.
122. Id.
193
19
Collier: Elevating Form Over Substance: Viar v. North Carolina Department
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2007
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
defendant must first show that his counsel's performance was defi-
cient and then that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced his
defense. 12 3 "[T]o establish prejudice, a 'defendant must show that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A rea-
sonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome.'"124 Further, the criminal defendant must make the
motion of appropriate relief to the trial court, which must be filed
either pro se or with new counsel.' 25
Strict adherence to rules of appellate procedure often undermines
concepts of professional ethics and responsibility. The North Carolina
Rules of Professional Conduct encourage lawyers to extend profes-
sional courtesy by alerting opposing counsel of his or her mistakes.
For example, a lawyer may contact an opposing lawyer who failed to
file a timely answer in order to remind the other lawyer of the error
and to give the other lawyer a last opportunity to file the pleading.126
However, it can be argued that if "appellee's counsel fails to file a
motion to dismiss for rules violations, then counsel is not aggressively
representing his or her client . . . [and] [clollegi4lity and principles of
professionalism will have to be set aside in order to ensure proper rep-
resentation of the appellate client."'127
NORTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT SPEAKS: STATE V. HART
In May 2007, the North Carolina Supreme Court issued an opin-
ion addressing the problems Viar had created. 128 The court first noted
that "every violation of the rules does not require dismissal of the
appeal or the issue, although some other sanction may be appropriate,
pursuant to Rule 25(b) or Rule 34 of the Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure.' 1 29 The court continued by discussing the issue of the phrase
first stated in Viar, but reaffirmed in State v. Buchanan, namely that
"[the] Supreme Court stated that this Court may not review an appeal
that violates the Rules of Appellate Procedure even though such viola-
tions neither impede our comprehension of the issues nor frustrate the
123. State v. Allen, 626 S.E.2d 271, 286 (N.C. 2006) (citing Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).
124. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
694).
125. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1411 to 1420 (2005).
126. Council of the N.C. State Bar, RPC 212 (1995).
127. Stann, 636 S.E.2d at 224 (Geer, J., dissenting).
128. Hart, supra note 135.
129. Id. at 202.
[Vol. 30:175
20
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 6
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol30/iss1/6
2007] VIAR V. NORTH CAROLINA DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION
appellate process. ' 3 0 The supreme court then stated, "[I]n Viar, we
neither admonished the Court of Appeals to avoid applying Rule 2, nor
did we state that the court may not review an appeal that violates the
Rules, even when rules violations 'd[o] not impede comprehension of
the issues on appeal or frustrate the appellate process. 13 The court
merely noted that the court of appeals majority had "justified its appli-
cation of Rule 2 in Viar by using that phrase. ' 132 The supreme court
reversed the decision of Munn v. N. C. State Univ. for those reasons
stated in Judge Jackson's dissenting opinion, but, according to Hart,
did not "intend to adopt the Buchanan analysis cited therein.
133
The supreme court then "expressly disavowed any interpreta-
tion"134 that all rules violations mandate dismissal. After a brief dis-
cussion of the case, the court analyzed the usage of Rule 2, noting that
it "must be used cautiously,"135 and reaffirming "'that Rule 2 relates to
the residual power of our appellate courts to consider, in exceptional
circumstances, significant issues of importance in the public interest
or to prevent injustice which appears manifest to the Court and only in
such instances.'" 1
36
The court's opinion in Hart, while a brief victory for those who
did not interpret Viar so strictly, left many questions unanswered.
Although noting that Rule 2 was still in existence and should be used
cautiously, the supreme court did nothing to clarify on which occa-
sions usage would be proper. Further, the court did not address or
attempt to define "manifest injustice." In fact, subsequent to the Hart
decision, the court of appeals has continued to grapple over the appro-
priate usage of Rule 2.
On June 5, 2007, the first two post-Hart decisions were filed. The
opinions illustrated a stark contrast of opinion, yet a clear example of
the problems Viar and its progeny created and Hart failed to solve. In
McKinley Bldg. Corp. v. Alvis, the court of appeals, in an opinion writ-
ten by Judge Jackson, invoked sanctions against defendants' counsel
pursuant to Rule 34(b) rather than dismissing the appeal. 137 Defend-
ants' brief violated Rules 28(b)(4), 28(b)(6), and 10(c), but the court
130. State v. Buchanan, 613 S.E.2d 356, 357 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
131. Hart, 644 S.E.2d at 203 (quoting Viar v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., 610 S.E.2d 360,
361 (N.C. 2005)).
132. Id. at 203.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 205.
136. Id. at 205 (quoting Steingress v. Steingress, 511 S.E.2d 298, 299-300 (N.C.
1999)).
137. McKinley Bldg. Corp. v. Alvis, 645 S.E.2d 219, 221 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007).
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concluded the violations were not "sufficiently egregious to warrant
dismissal.
138
Judge Tyson dissented, stating that "[b]ased upon the numerous
and egregious violations of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Pro-
cedure, defendants' appeal should be dismissed.'1 39 He stated the
majority "mischaracterizes this Court's duty when confronted with vio-
lations of the appellate rules in light of Hart.'1 40 He further argued
that "[n]othing in the record or briefs demonstrates the need to disre-
gard defendants' rule violations 'to prevent manifest injustice' or 'to
expedite decision in the public interest,"'1 41 thereby permitting the use
of Rule 2.
In a similar case filed the same day, Judge Tyson wrote the major-
ity opinion dismissing an appeal in Dogwood Dev. & Mgmt. Co. v.
White Oak Transp. Co. for identical rule violations as those found in
McKinley. Defendant failed to reference the record in violation of Rule
10(C), 1 42 failed to reference any assignments of error pursuant to Rule
28(b)(6),' 43 and failed to state the grounds for appellate review and
standard of review in accordance with Rule 28(b)(4). 144 The majority
declined to exercise Rule 2, because nothing "in the record of briefs
demonstrates the need to disregard the rule violations 'to prevent man-
ifest injustice' or 'to expedite decision in the public interest.' "141
Judge Hunter dissented in Dogwood, arguing for sanctions against
the party or attorney pursuant to Rule 25(b).' 46 In his opinion, dismis-
sal is the most severe punishment the court of appeals can impose, and
should "be reserved for cases where no other sanctions are appropri-
ate." '14 7 He noted that trial courts must consider lesser sanction before
imposing dismissal, and stated that "dismissals for basic rules viola-
tions without consideration of their type or degree is a too simplistic
method of enforcing the appellate rules and ignores the discretion
those rules give this Court."'
1 48
138. Id.
139. Id. at 225 (Tyson, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 228.
141. Id. at 227 (quoting N.C.R. App. P. 2 (2007)).
142. Dogwood Dev. & Mgmt. Co. v. White Oak Transp. Co., 645 S.E.2d 212, 214
(N.C. Ct. App. 2007).
143. Id. at 215.
144. Id. at 215-16.
145. Id. at 216 (quoting N.C.R. App. P. 2 (2007)).
146. Id. at 217-18 (Hunter, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 218.
148. Id.
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In the wake of Hart, it is clear that many questions are left unan-
swered. On the same day in June 2007, two opinions were filed regard-
ing the same issues, yet were decided in a completely opposite manner.
Such inconsistency is a manifest injustice. In Hart, the court stated
that "[flundamental fairness and the predictable operation of the
courts for which our Rules of Appellate Procedure were designed
depend upon the consistent exercise of this authority." 149 But such
consistency will never be found until further clarification of the appro-
priate usage of Rule 2 is given. As it stands now, judges with a procliv-
ity toward dismissal continue to have the discretion to determine what
exactly is or is not an injustice or a matter in the public interest. Until
fundamental changes are made, such arbitrariness and untrammeled
discretion will continue. If so, by exalting form over substance, these
panels will continue to deny effective access to the appellate tribunals,
possibly denying the North Carolina Bar important jurisprudential
decisions.
WHAT IS THE SOLUTION?
The supreme court's holding in Viar has been viewed as "strip-
ping the appellate courts of all discretion to make allowances for
human errors that make no difference in the review of an appeal."1 50
Several opinions state that because the court of appeals must follow
the strict mandate of Viar, failure to comply with rules of appellate
procedure warrants dismissal. 151
This Comment notes numerous examples of inconsistent applica-
tions of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure with regard to
civil appeals, criminal appeals, summary judgment appeals, and cases
with identical rule violations that were ruled oppositely by differing
panels. Further, there must be efforts to resuscitate Rules 25 and 34
which govern sanctions in terms of violations of the appellate rules.
The recurring problems cannot be solved without further guidance by
the North Carolina Supreme Court.
Such an answer may be found by establishing a balancing test,
which Judge Hunter first mentioned in his dissenting opinion in Walsh
v. Town of Wrightsville Beach Board of Aldermen. 1 2 The balancing test
149. Hart, 644 S.E.2d at 206.
150. Id.
151. Broderick v. Broderick, 623 S.E.2d 806, 811 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (Wynn, J.,
concurring); Consolidated Elec. Distrib., Inc. v. Dorsey, 613 S.E.2d 518, 521 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2005) (Wynn, J., concurring).
152. Walsh v. Town of Wrightsville Beach Bd. of Aldermen, 632 S.E.2d 271, 274
(N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (Hunter, J., dissenting).
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should read as follows: First, does the violation of rules of appellate
procedure violate a substantial rule which unduly prejudices the appel-
lee in responding to the appeal? Such violations would include failure
to serve the record on appeal and failure to include assignments of
error in the brief, notwithstanding cases of summary judgment. Sec-
ond, does the violation of the Rules of Appellate Procedure impede the
comprehension of the issues to the extent the court of appeals would
be creating an appeal for the appellant? If the answer to either of these
questions is yes, then the appeal should be dismissed unless the dis-
missal would result in manifest injustice to the party, or a public pol-
icy issue trumps the appellate rule violations. If, however, the appellee
is able to, and in fact does respond to the arguments on appeal, and the
appellate court is not frustrated by overly-broad assignments of error,
the appeal should be heard.
If the Rule violations are technical in nature regarding require-
ments such as spacing, font, number of lines per page, placement of
assignments of error at the end of the record, citing to the record or
transcript, and other minor technicalities, the appellate court, in its
discreti6n, should have the option of imposing sanctions pursuant to
Rules 25 and 34 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure
while hearing the merits of the case. Such sanctions would not impede
the administration of justice or access of meritorious appeals to the
appellate process and would curb the casual attitude of many members
of the North Carolina Bar. "In addition to not punishing parties for the
mistakes of their attorneys, this approach would also ensure that coun-
sel for both appellants and appellees are subjected to the same
scrutiny."' 1
53
A second, and simpler approach, would be to alter the existing
rules of appellate procedure to allow errors in appellant's brief or
record to be corrected upon notification by the clerk of court. This is
the approach taken by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit. 154 When an appellant fails to comply with the Federal
153. Jones v. Harrelson and Smith Contractors, LLC, 638 S.E.2d 222, 232 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2006) (Geer, J., dissenting).
154. 4TH CIR. R. 45. The Fourth Circuit's Local Rule 45 of Appellate Procedure
reads:
When an appellant in either a docketed or non-docketed appeal fails to
comply with the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure or the rules or
directives of this Court, the clerk shall notify the appellant or, if appellant is
represented by counsel, appellant's counsel that upon the expiration of 15
days from the date thereof the appeal will be dismissed for want of
prosecution, unless prior to that date appellant remedies the default. Should
the appellant fail to comply within said 15-day period, the clerk shall then
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Rules of Appellate Procedure, the clerk of court notifies the appellant
or appellant's counsel of the default, after which the appellant then has
a fifteen day window to rectify the error. 155 Such an approach would
allow equal access to the judicial system for all appellants, and would
virtually ensure due process for every meritorious appeal. This is also
the approach followed by Alabama, Mississippi, and Texas. 1
56
Although the Supreme Court recently spoke on the issue of appel-
late rule violations, 157 the court of appeals will continue to engage in
an elaborate waltz of disagreement in determining which appeals
should be considered. If the rigid construction of Viar continues, no
longer will appellants be able to smuggle imperfect briefs into an
appellate court where certain panels masquerade as a gatekeeper to
justice. First-time and tenured appellants, enthusiastic as they are
moments away from justice, will continue to be riddled with the bul-
lets of dismissal from the culture that Viar has created. Appellate
counsel, unless conforming to the rigid demands of Viar and its prog-
eny, will quickly learn that no longer will he or she receive a slap on
the hand in disapproval, but instead will be confronted with the threat
of complete dismissal.
Since April 2005, the focus of the appellate courts has shifted.
Before Viar, the philosophy of the appellate courts in North Carolina
rested on a lenient interpretation of the rules of appellate procedure
and equal access to justice by only punishing the most egregious viola-
tions. Since Viar, the espoused philosophy has been that in order to
salvage the integrity of the appellate process, meritorious appeals will
have to be sacrificed for the greater good. However, per se dismissal is
not the solution. Our appellate courts must exercise their wisdom and
discretion to determine those appeals which are appropriate and pun-
ish those which are not. It is their duty.
It is the court of appeals' responsibility to correct errors in the
trial courts, and the court does not "serve well the parties, the Bar, the
citizens of North Carolina, or justice by dismissing appeals for mis-
takes by lawyers that hinder neither ... [the court's] ability to perform
enter an order dismissing said appeal for want of prosecution, and shall issue
a certified copy thereof to thz clerk of the district court as and for the
mandate. In no case shall the appellant be entitled to reinstate the case and
remedy the default after the same shall have been dismissed under this rule,
unless by order of this Court for good cause shown. The dismissal of an
appeal shall not limit the authority of this Court, in an appropriate case, to
take disciplinary action against defaulting counsel.
155. Id.
156. ALA. R. App. P. 2(a)(2); Miss. R. App. P. 2(a)(2); TEX. R. App. P. 37.
157. State v. Hart, 644 S.E.2d 201 (N.C. 2007).
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. . . [its] responsibilities nor the ability of an opposing party to
respond.' 1 58 It is the job of the court of appeals to correct errors in the
trial court, and it is not doing that job when it dismisses appeals for
non-substantive rule violations.159
Trey Collier
158. Stann v. Levine, 636 S.E.2d 214, 225 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (Geer, J.,
dissenting).
159. Id.
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